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STOCK DIVIDENDS AS INCOME 
I N the case of Towne v. Eisner, the United States Supreme Court has recently held that under the Income Tax Law of I9I3, the 
stock dividends received by a shareholder during the year I9I4 
could not be taxed upon their full par value, where the corporate 
surplus thus distributed all accrued prior to January I, I9I3. The 
Treasury Department subsequently announced that the decision is 
not applicable to the Income Tax Law of I9I6.1 It is the purpose 
of this article to review the case of Towne v. Eisner,2 and then to 
discuss the soundness of the position taken by the Secretary of the 
Tre~sury. Thus two general questions are presented. The first is, 
"Can the decision of the Supreme Court in the Towne Case be up-
held?" The second is, "Is that section of the Income Tax Law 
of I9I6 that states that stock dividends are income and taxable, 
constitutional?" These questions will be dealt with in order. 2& 
I 
CAN '!'HE CASE OF 'l'OWNE V. EISNER BE UPHELD? 
It is believed that this question must be answered in the affirma-
tive. It is to be remembered that the corporate surplus that was 
transferred to capital and distributed among the shareholders dur-
ing the year I9I4 was all earned prior to January I, I9I3. The in-
come tax law of I9I3 required that the "gains, profits and income" 
must have accrued after March I, I9I3, if they were to be taxed 
as income for the calendar year. 8 Giving the words "gains and 
profits" their broadest interpretation, it cannot be said that the 
shareholders receiving these stock dividends had at that moment 
anything of value,-any gain or profit-which they did not have 
on March I, I9I3, before the transfer from undivided surplus to 
capital was made, other than, perhaps, some slight advantage grow-
ing out of the fact that their shares of stock had an increased mar-
ketability which was due to the fact that the original shares of 
stock had been replaced by several of a lower par value. In the 
'Letter of Commission, dated Jan. 10, 1918, addressed to Collectors of Internal Rev· 
enue. 
2 245 \V. S. 418, decided by the United States Supreme Court, Jan. 7, 1918. 
2a See the article "Corporate Earnings as 'Gains, Profit and Income,' as Depending 
upon the Time of their Accrual" by Robert M. Drysdale and Maurice C. McGiffin, 16 
Mich. L. Rev. 232. 
8 38 St. L. 168, 4 Fed. St. Ann. (2nd ed.) 241. 
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Towne Case the Supreme Court was not called upon to determine 
whether or not such an increase in value arising out of the better 
marketability of the shares of stock was income and taxable as 
such, The narrow question presented w~s whether or not the 
plaintiff shareholder had received gains, profits or income in the 
amount of $4I7,450. Clearly he had not, and the decision of the 
district court was properly reversed. 
II 
IS THAT PROVISION OF THI': INCOME TAX LAW OF I9I6, WHICH DE-
CLARES THAT STOCK DIVIDENDS ARE INCOME AND TAXABLE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL?. 
It is submitted that this question, too, must be answered in the 
affirmative. 
Prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, there was no constitutional 
provision dealing specifically with the power to tax incomes. It has 
been held,i however, that Congress always had the power to levy 
income taxes under the authority conferred upon Congress by sec. 
8 of Article I5 "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and ex-
cises," as a part included in the whole. The Constitution contains 
a further requirement that all direct taxes shall be apportioned.0 
Mr. Justice FULLER in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Compa]iy,1 
at page 557, aptly summed up the constitutional taxation require-
ments as follows: 
"In the matter of taxation, the constitution recognizes two 
great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two 
rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely, 
the rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of 
uniformity as to duties, imposts and excises." 
'Brushaber v. U. P. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 60 L Ed. 493, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452, 
' Consti~ution, Article I, Section 1, Clause 8, provides: 
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts 
and e.'tcises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general 
welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uni· 
form throughout the United States." 
e Constitution, Art. I, Section 2, Clause 3, provides: 
"Direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states * * * accord· 
ing to .their respective numbers." 
Constitution, Art. I, Section 9, Clause 4, provides: 
"No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to 
the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken." 
T 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 759, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673. 
158 U. S. 601, 39 L. Ed. uoB, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912. 
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In 1894, an act was passed,8 laying a tax on incomes from all 
dasses of property and other sources of revenue, which was not ap-
portioned, and which therefore was of course assumed to come 
within the classification of excises, duties and imposts, which were 
subject to the rule of uniformity, but not to the rule of apportion-
ment. The constitutional validity of this law was challenged on 
the ground that it did not fail within the class of excises, duties and 
imposts, but was direct in the constitutional sense, and was there-
fore void for want of apportionment. The Supreme Court, in the 
case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trnst Company0 had this 
question presented to it and held that the law was unconstitutional 
because, in the ·substance of things, it was direct on property in a 
~onstitutional sense, since to burden an income by a tax was, from 
the point of substance, to burden the property from which the in-
come was derived, and thus accomplish the very thing which the 
provision as to apportionment of direct taxes was adopted to. pre-
vent. 
Thereafter, on February 25, 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment be-
<:ame effective. It provides : 
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes 
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without appor-
tionment among the several states, and without regard to 
any census or enumeration." 
On October 13, 1913, the Internal Revenue Act of 1913 was 
passed.10 This act was held to be constitutional in the case of Bmsh-
aber v. U. P. Ry. Co.,11 where the history outlined above is set 
forth more in detail. From the opinon in the Brushaoer Case, the 
following propositions may be deduced: 
(a) Congress has power to levy taxes on all properties 
and upon all incomes. 
(b) Direct taxes on property, other than income taxes, 
must be apportioned. 
( c) In all cases, indirect taxes must be uniform. 
( d) By virtue of the Sixteenth Amendment, income taxes 
need not be apportioned, and this is true even though such 
income taxes, in their substance, are direct taxes imposed be-
cause of the ownership of property, either real or personal. 
8 28 Stat. at L. so9, Chap. 349. 
9 IS7 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 7S9• IS Sup. Ct. Rep, 673, 
IS8 U. S. 6oI, 39 L. Ed. IIo8, IS Sup. Ct. Rep. 912. 
10 Sec. II, Chap. I6, 38 Stat. at L. I66. 
n 240 U. S. I, 60 L. Ed. 493, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4s2. 
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It is thus apparent that Congress could tax a corporation on its 
capital stock as well as upon its income, and likewise could' tax an 
fodividual on his share of the capital stock in a corporation, as well 
as 011 his income derived therefrom. Congress therefore has the 
power to tax stock dividends. The Internal Revenue Act of 1916 
does not apportion the taxes according to any census or enumera-
tion. The section of the Act of 1916 which is under consideration 
must be upheld if this is an indirect tax, because clearly there is 
geographical uniformity, and that is the only kind of uniformity 
required by the constitution.12 
However, it is expressly stated by the Supreme Court in the 
Bmsh<iber Case that the Sixteenth Amendment does not do away 
with the requirement of apportionment of direct taxes, in any case 
other than that of an income tax. Therefore this tax is only invalid 
if in the ~rst place it is not an income tax, and if in the second 
place, it is a direct tax. What, then, was the meaning of the word 
"income," as used in the Sixteenth Amendment? 
In 1912 the leading dictionaries defined "income" as the annual 
receipts, gains, profits or emoluments derived from capital invest-
ed.18 Income is commonly thought of as being money only. It is 
more correct to say that it is usually measured in terms of money, 
but that gains, profits and income are actually synonymous. It would 
seem, therefore, that a shareholder has received income, under these 
definitions, when the corporation has accumulated a surplus within a 
given year, whether or not this surplus has been transferred to cap-
12 Brusbaber v. U. P. Ry. Co., supra. 
12 Definitions of "income": 
The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia: "That which comes in to a person 
as payment for labor or services rendered in some office, or as gain from lands, 
business, tlv! investment of capital, etc.; receipts or emoluments regularly ac-
accruing, ~!ther in a given time, or, when unqualified, annually; the annual 
receipt of a person or a corporation; revenue." 
The Oxford Dictionary: "That .which comes in as the periodical product 
of one's work, business, lands, or investment (considered in reference to its 
amount, and commonly expressed in terms of money); annual or periodical re-
ceipts accruing to a person or corporation; revenue." 
The New Standard Dictionary: "The amount of money coming to a person 
or corporation within a specified time or regularly (when unqualified, annually), 
whether as payment for services, interest, or profit from investment; revenue." 
Webster's New International Dictionary: "That gain or recurrent benefit 
(usually measured in money) which proceeds from labor, business or property; 
commercial revenue or receipts of any kind, including wages or salaries, the 
proceeds of agriculture or commerce, the rents of houses, or the return on in· 
vestments. * * * Synonyms: Gain, profit, proceeds, interest, emoluments, pro-
duce." 
Worcester's Dictionary: "Gain derived from any business or property; 
produce, profit, revenue." 
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ital stock or distributed in stock dividends. To illustrate: Take a 
corporation with a fully paid capital stock of $1,000, consisting of 
l,ooo shares of stock, held by l,ooo shareholders, each share of an 
approximate value of $r.oo. Suppose that this corporation accu-
mulates a surplus of $1,000 during the year 1917. Then each share-
holder, at that time, has something that is worth more than one 
dollar if he chooses to sell his share of stock. Can it be said that no 
gain or profit has accrued to him during the y~ar of 1917 merely be-
cause he chooses to retain his share in the expectation that it may 
become more valuable during the next year? If it be assumed that 
income-gains and profits-need not be money or cash, but only 
need be measured in terms of money or cash, it would appear that 
an individual shareholder has received income during a given cal-
endar year if in that year his share of stock has increased in value. 
It is not the declaration of a stock dividend that gives him this 
profit, but the fact that his undivided share in the corporate enter-
prise has increased in worth. It is thus conceivable that an indi-
vidual shareholder receives income--something in the form of a 
gain or profit-in exact proportion to the increase in value of the 
capital he has invested. Whether or not Congress will take it upon 
itself to tax such income before a stock or cash dividend has been 
declared is a different question. But it is submitted that a cash divi-
dend, a stock dividend, or an undivided surplus of a corporation may 
be termed the income of a shareholder under the definition of in-
come as laid down by the leading dictionaries. 
If the legal definitions of income, which were pronounced ·by the 
Supreme Court prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, are also con-
sistent with the principles above laid down then we must say that 
Congress could state that stock dividends received by a shareholder 
were income and taxable as such. It is only necessary to say that 
the Supreme Court believed that a corporate undivided: surplus or 
the stock dividend received by an individual shareholder coield be 
termed his income. The question then to be decided is whether or 
not Congress intended that it should be so considered. 
There are several United States Supreme Court decisions defin-
ing income. One of the earliest is the case of Brainard, Collector, 
v. H11bbard.U· This was a suit to recover back money paid by plain-
tiff, under protest, as a tax on his income for the year 1864 under 
the Income Tax Law of l864.1 G Plaintiff was a shareholder in a 
corporation and was taxed on his proportional ~hare of the cor-
porate undivided surplus that had accrued during the year 1864. 
"12 \Vall. 1, 20 L. Ed. 272, decided in 1871. 
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Plaintiff contended that his interest in such corporate profits was 
not legally subject to any such assessment and levy as it appeared 
fhat the corporation had invested the profits in part in real estate, 
macl}inery and raw materials proper for carrying on the business, 
and that the same remained so invested at the time the duties were 
assessed and collected. Part only of the profits of that year were 
so invested, and it was that part of the same which was not in-
cluded in the dividends of the year, and which plaintiff. refused to 
add to the list he delivered to the assessor, and which was the sub-
ject of controversy. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff bad no 
right of action, inasmuch as no appeal had been taken seasonably ; 
and that even though this had been done, still plaintiff bad been 
taxed properly because his share in the undivided corporate profits 
was income and taxable as such. The court interpreted the act and 
found a clear intention on the part of Congress to tax such income 
as plaintiff's own gains and profits, and then held that those profits 
were income.16 
Here then is a clear statement by the Supreme Court of the 
United States to the effect that a shareholder's interest in the un-
divided annual profits of a corporation was to be considered as in-
come when the Congress evidenced an intention to tax such income. 
If the corporate surplus which is invested in real estate and machin-
11 13 Stat. at L. 281. 
10 At 277 of 20 L. Ed. the court says: 
"Decided cases are referred to in which it is held that a stockholder has 
no title for certain purposes to the earnings, net or otherwise, of a railroad 
prior to the dividend being declared, and it cannot be. doubted that those decisions 
are correct as applied to the respective subject-matters invoived in the contro-
versies. Minot v. Payne, 99 Mass., 106; Goodwin v. Hardy, 57 Me., 145. Grant 
all that; still it is true that the owner of a share of stock in a corporation holds 
the share with all its incidents, and that among those incidents is the right to 
receive all future dividends, not then divided. Profits are incident to the share 
to which the owner at once becomes entitled provided he remains a member of 
the corporation until a dividend is made. March v. Railroad, 43 N. H. 520. 
Regarded as an incident to the shares, undivided profits are property of the 
shareholder, and as such are the proper subject of sale, gift or devise. Undi· 
vided profits invested in real estate, machinery or raw material, for the purpose 
of being manufactured, are investments in which the stockholders are interested, 
and when such profits are actually appropriated to the payment of the debts of 
the corporation, they serve to increase the market value of the shares, whether 
held by the original subscribers or by assignees. But t11e decisive answer to the 
proposition is that Co11gress possesses t11e power to lay and collect ta:res, duties, 
imposts and e:rcises, and it is as competent for Congress to ta:r annual gains 
and prbfits before they are divided among the holders of the stock as afterwards, 
and it is clear that Congress did direct that all such gains and profits, whether 
divided or otherwise, should be included in estimating tlie annual gains, profits 
or income liable to ta.ration under the provisions of tliat Act. Annual gains 
oHd profits, wlretlrer di'tided or not, are property, and, therefore, are ta:rable." 
(Italics ours.) 
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ery constitutes income of the shareholders, then clearly a stock div-
idend would be no different. And the intention of Congress in the 
Act of 1916 is unmistakable.17 
The next decision is that of Bailey v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Coni-
pany.18 In this case the Supreme Court again stated that the earn-
ings of the company belonged to the shareholders. The case .is no 
authority on its facts, because the tax was levied against the cor· 
poration, but it is important to be familiar with its holding in view 
of the later language of the Supreme Court when discussing this 
decision in the case of Gibbons v. Mahon.19 The Bailey Case· has la!n-
guage to the effect that corporate earnings belong to the sharehold-
ers. If this is so, then corporate earnings are alike corporate in-
come and the income of the shareholders. Each has received a 
profit arising out of capital invested. The corporate profit is money. 
The shareholder's profit is something of value that can be turned 
into money. 
In the famous case of Gibbons v. Mahon, the term "income" was 
again defined. But a reference to the facts of the case again shows 
that the Supreme Court·was deciding what income might be, and 
not what income must be. It was here held that as between life ten-
ant and remainderman, where a clear intention to give stock divi-
dends to the remainderman is shown, this intention will be fol-
lowed. The court reasons that stock dividends are usually thought 
of as capital. It was to be presumed that the testator intended that 
the usual presumption was to be followed, and that the life tenant 
should not take if the corporation declared a stock dividend ·rather 
than a cash dividend. But it is submitted that the decision goes off 
on the intention of the testator rather than the necessary, as dis-
tinguished from the usual, meaning of income. Suppose that the 
bequest had read "All income is to go to the life tenant, and stock 
dividends are to be considered as income." Would not the Supreme 
Court have held that the stock dividends were to go to the life 
tenant as the testator intended? When the general law applicable to 
11 Act of Sept. 8, 1916, part l, sec. 2: 
"Sec. 2. " " " (a) the term 'dividends' as used in this title shall be held to 
mean any distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation, " " " and 
payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stock of the corpor=•ion, " * " 
which stock dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash value." 
18 22 Wall. 604, 22 L. Ed. 840, decided in 1875. Here the Income Tax Law of 1864 
was again before the Supreme Court. The narrow question presented to the court was 
whether or not certain "interest certificates" issued to the stockholders were "dividends 
in scrip" which were taxable to the corporation under the law of 1864. The court 
found that said '.'interest certificates" bore all the attributes of "dividends in scrip" and 
held them to be taxable. 
10 136 U. S. 549, 34 L. Ed. 525, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1057, decided in 1890. 
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situations of this nature is considered, this becomes apparent. Mat-
ters of fairness between the parties and the intention of the testator 
govern rather than the intrinsic distinction between capital and in-
com~. The method of approach is, who in justice is entitled to this 
benefit? The party intended by the testator. Then it iS often said 
by way of dictum, "The life tenant is entitled to this dividend; 
therefore it is income." But the courts do not say, "This is income; 
therefore it goes to the life.tenant regardless of the intention of the 
testator."20 In the Gibbons Case, counsel for the life tenant cited the 
case of Baile)• v. Railway. The Supreme Court stated that a different 
rule could well apply as between life tenant and remainderman, and 
between the government and one sought to be taxed.21 From this it 
20 There are at least three distinct rules, on the authorities, for determining whether 
the life tenant or the remaindennan shall take a stock dividend. In substance, Mr. Cook 
in his treatise on Coprorations, 6th ed., chap. XXXIII, states the rules as follows: The 
majority of Ainerican courts follow the Pennssfrania Rule, which proceeds on the theory 
that the court, in disposing of stock or property dividends, as between life tenant and 
remainderman, may properly inquire as to the time when the fund out of which the ex· 
traordinary dividend is to be paid was earned and .accumulated, and also as to the method 
of accumulation. Ii it is found to have accrued or been earned before the life estate 
arose, it is held that the remainderman takes, without reference to the time it is declared 
or made payable. But when it is found that the fund, out of which the dividend is paid, 
accrued or was earned, not before, but after the life estate arose, then it is held that it 
belongs to the tenant for life. (Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368, Wiltbank's Appeal, 69 
Pa. St. 256.) The courts in these jurisdictions will also take into consideration the 
custom and regularity of the corporation in accumulating its surplus, inasmuch as the 
testator may be presumed to have expected the corporation to continue its accumulation 
of a surplus or to provide for improvements out of profits. (Spooner v. Phillips, 62 
Conn. 62; Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257; Van Doren v. Olden, 19. N. J. Eq. 176.) The rule 
which prevails in Massachusetts, and ·at least in three other states, is sometimes called 
"the rule in Minot's case." It regards cash dividends, whether large or small, as in· 
come, and stock di11idends, whenever earned and however declared, as capital. Cash div-
idends, in these jurisdictions, belong to the tenant for life and stock dividends to the 
corpus (Minot v. raine, 99 Mass. 101). As the rule works a hardship in many instances, 
it is not rigidly adhered to, but the court, in deciding whether the distribution is a 
stock or cash dividend, may consider the actual and substantial character of the trans· 
action, and not its nominal character merely. (Leland v. Hayden, 102 Mass. 542.) In 
England, an ordinary, regular, usual cash or stock or property dividend belongs to the 
life tenant, while an extraordinary cash or stock or property dividend belongs to the 
corpus of the trust (Witts v. Steere, 13 Ves. Jr. 363; Norris v. Harrison, 2 Madd. 268). 
:i The court says, at page 527 of 34 L. Ed.: 
"In Bailey v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 89 U. S. 22 Wall 604, cited 
for the plaintiff, the point decided was that certificates, issued by a railroad cor· 
poration to its stockholders as representing earnings which had been used in 
the construction and equipment of its road, and payable, at the option of the 
company, with dividends like those paid on the stock, were within that provision 
Qf the. Internal Revenue Laws, which enacted that any railroad company 'that 
may have declared any dividend in script or money due or payable to its stock· 
holders.' 'as part of the earnings, profits, income or gains of such company, and 
all profits of such company carried to the account of any fund, or used for con· 
struction, shall be subject to and pay a tax of five pe"r centum on the amount 
of all such' 'dividends or profits, whenever and wherever the same shall be pay· 
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appears that the Gibbons Case is in no wise inconsistent with the 
proposition here contended for, viz. : Income, when used in a statute 
taxing the shareholders of a corporation, in both its popular and 
legal sense. has a different meaning than is ordinarily the case. 
The case of Logan County v. United States,22 is likewise one·deal-
ing with the nature of stock dividends. That case merely holds 
that where a tax is assessed and collected upon the undivided sur-
plus of a corporation, it will not be presumed that the tax so col-
lected was upon the individual shareholders' undivided interests 
where the shareholders in question were municipal corporations, and 
hence not subject to the tax. It does not hold that the undivided 
corporate surplus cannot be held to be the income of the individual 
shareholders when the Congress has designated it as such, but only 
that the tax collectors shall not be presumed to have levied a tax 
on this income of the individuals where they had no power to do so, 
and it is possible to say that the tax was merely upon the corporate 
property. 
able, and to whatsoever party or person, the same may be payable.' Acts of 
June 30, 1864, chap. 173, sec. 122 (13 Stat. 284): July 13, 1886, chap. 184, sec. 
9 (14 Stat. 138, 139). The question at issue was not between the owners of 
successfoe interests in particular sl1ares, but between the corporation· and the 
government, and depended upon the terms of a statute carefully framed to pre· 
vent corporations from evading payment of the ta; upon their earnings.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
22 169 U. S. 255, 42 L. Ed. 737, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 361. This case also arose under the 
Income Tax Law of 1864. Plaintiff was seeking a refund of taxes assessed and collected 
on the theory that no tax could be laid against municipal corporations. The collector had 
previously assessed and collected from the corporation in which plaintiff municipal° corpora· 
tion was a shareholder, a tax on its undivided surplus. Thereafter the corporation declared 
a stock dividend, said stock dividend being less by the amount of the tax previously im· 
posed on the undivided surplus than would otherwise have been the case. The act pro· 
vided that a duty of five per cent. should be laid on stock dividends, the deduction to 
be made by the corporation. 
Held, the stock dividends were not ta.xed, but the only tax levied was against the 
surplus belonging to the corporation. But the court expressly held that the United States 
could tax a stock dividend· where the shareholder was not a municipal corporation, saying, 
at page 739 of 42 L. Ed.: 
"By the provisions of the internal revenue act of 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 223, 
chap. 173, sec. 122), a stocl< diyidend was subject ~o a t:ix of five per cent. * * *" 
"Under this plain provision of the statute it is perfectly clear that the stock 
dividend in question was a proper subject of ta.xation. But, as already men· 
tioned, there is no finding that any such tax has been paid, and, of course, none 
that any deduction on its account was ever made from any dividend due the 
coputy. On the contrary, from the findings that have been made, it appears that 
the only tax which has been paid was paid by the railroad company upon its 
undistributed surplus at a time when such fund was its own absolute property." 
It is not to be denied that there is language to the effect that until a cash dividend 
is declared, no income accrues to the shareholders. But it is also to be noticed that the 
case of Brainard v. Hubbard, supra, is not referred to, and thus presumably not over· 
ruled, in view of the fact that the cases are distinguishable. 
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It will be well now to summarize what has been said thus far: 
(I) The Internal Revenue Act of I9I6 lays a tax on all 
stock dividends received by corporate shareholders. This tax 
.is not apportioned, and therefore is void if,; in the first place, 
it is not aµ "income" tax, as that word is used in the Six-
teenth Amendment, and if, in the second place, it is a direct 
tax. 
( 2) To determine the meaning of the word "income,'' as 
used in. the Sixteenth Amendment, the current use of the 
word at the time the Sixteenth Amendment was enacted 
must be looked at, together with all definitions that the Su-
preme Court of the United States had previously given, and 
the language of the preceding.income tax laws. 
(a) The leading dictionaries in I9I2 defined "income" as 
a gain or profit derived from capital invested. It .is consistent 
with this definition to say that "income," as, thus defined, in-
cludes the undivided profits or surpfos of a corporation, 
whether or not a stock dividend has been declared. 
(b) The case of Gibbons v. Mahon and all other cases 
dealing with the respective rights of life tenant and remain-
dermen in the last analysis appear to go off on a different 
ground from that of the distinction between capital and in-
come, and are therefore not controlling authorities in this 
discussion. 
( c) .There appears to be no direct decision on the point 
in question by the Supreme Court, but there are three dicta, 
one of which states squarely that for the purposes of an in-
come tax law, the undivided corporate surplus may be taxed 
as the shareholders' income. If this be true, then a stock 
dividend may be so taxed, as its only eIJect is to re-apportion 
the respective interest which ~ach shareholder has in this 
undivided surplus. · The dicta in the other two Supreme 
C9urt decisions are in no wise conflicting with this when the. 
facts of the cases under which they· arose· are considered. 
(d) A dictum in the case of Gibbons v. Mahon is to the 
effect that a different rule may _apply. when the question is 
between the government and one questioning a tax, and 
when it is between life tenant and remainderman. 
( e.) Every income tax law has used the words "gains and 
profits" as synonymous with income, and the Act of I864 
stated that stock dividends and the corporate undivided sur-
plus were to be taxed as income of the shareholClers. 
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(f) The recent case of Towne v. Eisner states nothing 
in conflict with these conclusions. 
(3) Every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality 
of an Act of Congress. It is therefore not necessary to say 
that the "income" of a shareholder always includes his pro 
rata interest in the corporate undivided surplus, but only that 
the word "income," as used by the Supreme Court prior to 
the Sixteenth Amendment, may consistently under facts par-
allel to those now in question, be so construed. 
(4) That provision of the Internal Revenue Act of 1916 
which defines stock dividends as income, is constitutional, 
because "income," as defined by the leading dictionaries, by 
Congress, and by the Supreme Court prior to the Sixteenth 
Amendment may consistently include the profit or gain of a 
stockholder of a corporation arising out of the enhancement 
of the value of his interest in the corporate enterprise, 
which flows from the corporate earnings. There is no ne-
cessity, therefore, to inquire whether or not this is a direct 
tax. It is believed that it is, when the substance of things is 
considered. 
This appears to be a proper solution on principle. To hold other-
wise would be to defeat the purposes of the Act. The shareholders, 
who are often the ones who vote a stock dividend, could themselves 
always defer the collection of a just tax on their earnings till the 
crisis had passed and the law had been repealed. It is no answer to 
say there is double taxation; because the same double taxation exists 
in the case of a cash dividend, and furthermore, there is no,_ consti-
tutional inhibition against double taxation. Nor can it be said that 
the Act does not purport to tax the undivided corporate surplus, be-
cause it does-when a stock dividend is declared. That time is taken 
as the most convenient to determine the amount of gains or profits 
the shareholders have received in a given calendar year. Further-
more, Section 3 of the Act23 taxes the corporate undivided surplus 
when the Secretary of the Treasury believes that an attempt is be-
ing made to avoid the Act. It may be argued that even though an 
undivided corporate profit may be thought of as the income of the 
. shareholders, when this is transferred to capital stock, it 
thereupon ceases to be income and is no longer taxable; and 
that this is especially true when the shareholders themselves have 
no word in such trans£ er and no control over it. But the answer 
is, that once ~'the thing is ascertained as being subject to the income 
23 Act of Sept. 8, 1916, part l, sec. 3: 
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tax, it matters not what is done with it afterwards."24 Nor does it 
make any difference that the one taxed has no power over the fund 
so subject to the tax, because he receives his- benefit if it is put to a 
corporate use. 
RoBERT E. MoRE. 
Denver, Colorado. 
"'H. R. H. The Nizam State Ry. Co. v. Wyatt, (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 598. Here a 
corporation was contesting the collection of an income tax. 16 and 17 Viet." c. 34 imposed 
duties O!l gains and profits according to five schedules. Schedule C was as follows: 
"Schedule C. For in respect of all profits arising from interest, annuities, 
dividends and shares of annuities, payable to any person, body politic or cor· 
porate." * • * 
The corpt-ration had a contract whereby it was bound to apply one per cent. of an 
annuity to be received from the Nizam of Hyderabad to trustees to form a sinking fund 
for the redemption. of the debenture capital. The company claimed to deduct the amount 
put into the sinking fund, claiming it could not be income inasmuch as they bad no power 
over it. The court held that this part of the annuity was subject to the tax, saying, 
through Hawkins, J., at page 556: 
"It seems to me that the application of the money has not so very much to 
do with the matter. The money paid by the Nizam is paid as income and in the 
company's bands is income, which they are bound to apply, no doubt, to pay• 
ment of their just liabilities to shareholders, and debenture holders, and to a 
sinking fund. But it is income prepaid, which has to be applied and appro· 
priated in the interests of the company. I cannot regard it as other than income 
supplied by the Nizam under his contract, and when it comes into the hands 
of the company it is, I think, in the same condition as income earned, subject 
only to this difference, that it does not rest with the directors to decide whether 
a sinking fund shall be create4 or not, but there is an obligation on them to 
create a sinking fund imposed by the contract under which the income is sup-
plied. * * *" 
